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ABSTRACT
This essay discusses two contributions of the principle of sufficient 
autonomy to educational justice. In Just Enough, Liam Shields criticizes 
instrumental accounts of autonomy. According to these accounts, 
autonomy is valuable insofar as it contributes to well-being. Shields argues 
that instrumental arguments fail to support mandatory autonomy 
education in all cases, while his non-instrumental principle of sufficient 
autonomy does support this. This essay develops a version of the 
instrumental argument and argues this version can do the work of 
supporting mandatory autonomy education. Another contribution of the 
principle of sufficient autonomy is the requirement of talents discovery. 
According to Shields, the requirement of talents discovery renders Rawls’s 
principle of fair equality of opportunity more plausible, since one’s chances 
of accessing a given economic position depend on one’s opportunities to 
discover one’s innate talents. This essay argues that Rawlsian fair equality 
of opportunity does not have the same implications as the principle of 
sufficient autonomy as to which types of talents should be discovered and 
to what extent.
Keywords: autonomy, education, liberalism, talents, equality of 
opportunity
1. INTRODUCTION
Sufficientarianism is a doctrine that affirms that what matters is whether 
individuals have enough of the relevant goods. In his book Just Enough: 
Sufficiency as a Demand for Justice, Liam Shields develops an alternative 
original account of sufficientarianism. According to this account, once the 
threshold is secured, there could be further moral requirements. However, 
the nature and weight of the reasons to secure and reallocate the relevant 
goods changes after individuals have reached the threshold (Shields, 2016: 30).
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In Chapter 3, Shields states and defends the principle of sufficient 
autonomy:
“Principle of sufficient autonomy: We have weighty, non-instrumental, 
non-egalitarian, satiable reasons to secure enough autonomy for 
everyone to enjoy the social conditions of freedom, the conditions 
under which we freely form and revise our conception of the good life.” 
(Shields, 2016, 53)
A person has sufficient autonomy if (1) she is well-informed, meaning 
that she can establish third-person assurance of the freedom (not the 
truth) of her beliefs; (2) she is capable of giving reasons for her views; (3) 
she is disposed to exchange reasons and to participate in public reasoning 
activities with others (Shields, 2016: 53, 84).
The fourth chapter of Just Enough is devoted to showing the contributions 
of the principle of sufficient autonomy to debates about education. This 
essay discusses two of these contributions. First, Shields argues that 
instrumental arguments for autonomy-supporting education fail to 
support mandatory autonomy education in all cases; his non-instrumental 
argument does support this. This essay develops a version of the 
instrumental argument and argues this version can do the work of 
supporting mandatory autonomy education as well as the principle of 
sufficient autonomy, and perhaps even better (Section 2). Second, Shields 
argues that the principle of sufficient autonomy implies a requirement of 
talents discovery. According to Shields, the requirement of talents discovery 
renders Rawls’s principle of fair equality of opportunity more plausible, 
since one’s chances of accessing a given economic position depend on 
one’s opportunities to discover one’s innate talents. In Section 3, I shall 
argue that Rawlsian fair equality of opportunity does not have exactly the 
same implications as the principle of sufficient autonomy as to which 
types of talents should be discovered and to what extent.
2. INSTRUMENTAL AND NON-INSTRUMENTAL ARGUMENTS 
FOR MANDATORY AUTONOMY EDUCATION
The justification of the principle of sufficient autonomy appeals to non-
instrumental reasons to promote autonomy. The chapter entitled 
“Sufficiency and Education” argues that the principle of sufficient 
autonomy provides a more decisive reason to support mandatory autonomy 
education than instrumental arguments for autonomy. A concrete issue at 
stake is that parents of conservative religious communities may oppose 
certain forms of autonomy-promoting education. They fear that mandatory 
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autonomy education will turn their children away from the core beliefs, 
values and behaviors endorsed by their communities. They could (and do) 
appeal to religious freedom or parental rights to justify their position. 
From a perspective centered on children’s interests, the main worry is that 
mandatory autonomy education could jeopardize the long-term well-being 
of child-members of conservative communities. Autonomy education may 
estrange these children from their family and community. This would 
make it impossible for them to meaningfully sustain important familial 
and social relationships. They would also be deprived of the important 
contribution of cultural affiliation to one’s sense of identity and capacity 
for wholehearted commitments.
According to Shields, the principle of sufficient autonomy succeeds in 
showing that securing a certain level of autonomy outweighs these 
countervailing considerations, while instrumental accounts of the value of 
autonomy do not (Shields, 2016: 90). The instrumental argument for 
autonomy education affirms that autonomy is good because it leads to 
something else, namely well-being or flourishing. It derives the value of 
autonomy education from the good of well-being. Worries with the 
instrumental argument arise from the contingent character of the 
connection between autonomy and well-being (Shields, 2016: 72). Such 
worries need not arise if the value of autonomy is not derivative. Note this 
does not necessarily mean concerns with the well-being of children should 
disappear. Valuing autonomy non-instrumentally does not preclude 
Shields from valuing well-being non-instrumentally. If so, the case of 
child-members of conservative communities will require him to balance 
autonomy against well-being. This balancing reasoning might lead to 
practical conclusions similar to those reached by “instrumentalists”. To 
strengthen the case for the non-instrumental argument, it seems we need 
to know why the intrinsic value of autonomy is superior to the value of 
well-being.
While the case for the non-instrumental account might not be as strong 
as expected, the case for the instrumental one could be stronger than 
Shields assumes. A closer examination of the connection between 
autonomy and well-being shows that the instrumental argument provides 
little support to those who want to withdraw child-members of conservative 
communities from autonomy education. How detrimental we think 
autonomy education is to these children depends on the nature and the 
importance of the connection between autonomy and well-being, on one 
hand, and (as Shields himself puts it) on the conception of well-being we 
assume, on the other hand (Shields, 2016: 93).
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The instrumental argument affirms autonomy leads causally to well-
being. The causal connection between autonomy and well-being can be 
understood in at least two ways (Schinkel, 2010: 100):
(a) Autonomy may/is likely contribute to individual well-being. 
(b) Autonomy is necessary for individual well-being.
Shields’s argument must assume version (a) of the instrumental 
argument since version (b) would also succeed in convincing those who 
are concerned with children’s well-being that autonomy education should 
be mandatory. Could it be the case that autonomy is necessary for 
individual well-being? Drawing on Raz’s reflections, as well as on the 
philosophical works they have influenced (e.g. Brighouse, 2005; Raz, 1986; 
Wall, 1998; White, 2006), I would like to examine two ways in which an 
adequate level of autonomy might be necessary to live well.
Autonomy is unlikely to be necessary to achieve some conceptions of 
well-being such as those based on hedonistic and actual preference 
satisfaction. It is possible to experience pleasure or to satisfy one’s actual 
preferences without being autonomous. This is emphasized by Shields’s 
discussions of happiness pills and cheap tastes inculcation (Shields, 2016: 
74-76).1 What is wrong with these examples is that people by-pass the 
autonomous deliberative process involved in forming and realizing their 
conception of the good life.
Raz’s partly subjective conception of well-being (Raz, 1986: 288–312) is 
not vulnerable to counterexamples like the happiness pill. According to 
Raz, a person’s well-being depends, first, on her capacity to meet basic 
biological needs and, second, on the successful pursuit of her current and 
future goals. The content of these goals does not matter so long as they are 
independently valued by the person herself. This means attempts to 
improve the life of someone else by making her achieve a good she does not 
and will not see as her goal will fail. Suppose Mary’s mother tries to secure 
her daughter’s future well-being by preventing her from studying history, a 
subject Mary is passionate about. Mary’s mother believes history is a poor 
choice of major because she does not see the point of spending one’s life 
neck-deep in dusty archives to write unreadable books. She pushes Mary 
to study communication instead, a seemingly more fun major. Unless 
Mary revises her judgment on the merits of a history major, her mother’s 
attempt to make her happy will be unsuccessful. 
However, success in pursuing a goal, regardless of its objective value, 
does not suffice to secure a person’s well-being. A person’s well-being also 
1 Note that the cheapness itself is not problematic for autonomy. What is problematic 
is that they have been inculcated in a non-autonomous way. See Zwarthoed (2015)
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depends on the value of the goals she pursues. We evaluate goals, we have 
reasons to pursue them, and some reasons are better than others. A person 
has a goal, properly speaking, only if her reasons for having it are valid. 
Failing to achieve a goal which is actually supported by no valid reason is a 
“blessing in disguise” (Raz, 1986: 301). Suppose Mary is genuinely interested 
in history, but decides to study philosophy instead because she believes a 
philosophy degree is more likely to improve her job prospects. Now, 
suppose also that Mary’s belief turns out to be false. History graduates are 
actually more popular with employers. If this is the case, Mary does not 
have, in a normatively relevant sense, the goal to become a philosophy 
graduate. Of course, it is a psychological fact that she has the desire to 
study philosophy (since she ignores her reason for having this goal is not 
valid). But, properly speaking, she does not have the goal to study 
philosophy because studying philosophy will not contribute to the success 
of her life. If she is not admitted to a philosophy program, this failure might 
contribute to her well-being unbeknownst to her.
Since there are no reasons to value worthless cheap tastes or a life 
determined by a happiness pill, Raz’s conception of well-being avoids 
Shields’s objections to welfarism. Now, having goals does not suffice to live 
well; one must also succeed in pursuing them. A person’s goals provide her 
with action reasons, reasons that speak in favor of performing certain 
actions. Others cannot reach a person’s goals for her: actively pursuing the 
goals that constitute one’s life is constitutive of living well. This does not 
mean the good life must be athletic or hyperactive. A flourishing life can 
certainly consist of modest pursuits. What matters is that the person 
achieves these goals herself, lives her life herself and from the inside.
According to Raz, these goals need not be acquired in an autonomous 
way (Raz, 1986: 290–291) and one can live well without being autonomous. 
Yet I submit that a minimal degree of autonomy is, in fact, necessary to 
secure the dependency of a person’s goals on reasons. It is true that a 
person may acquire goals she has valid reasons to value through non-
autonomous processes such as habituation, early socialization, and so on. 
In fact, most of our goals are acquired this way. Furthermore, the successful 
pursuit of some possibly attractive goals, such as ballet performance, 
requires the child to commit to cultivate her talents from an early age, 
before she is fully autonomous (Arneson and Shapiro, 1996: 392).
However, being equipped with the deliberative capacities that partly 
constitute autonomy enables people to avoid at least two potential obstacles 
in the process of assessing the validity of the reasons one has to have 
certain goals. The first obstacle is: I cannot make sure the reasons I have to 
pursue goals are independently valid if I do not possess the skills and 
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knowledge needed to critically assess, or reassess, their validity. Without a 
minimal degree of autonomy, I cannot make sure the goals I pursue are 
based on valid reasons, and therefore I cannot make sure these goals will 
contribute to my well-being. As Arneson and Shapiro put it, we do not want 
to choose life plans we just believe are valuable, but we do want to choose 
those which truly are valuable. Insofar as truly valuable life plans are those 
which resist critical reflection, autonomy is a good instrument to verify 
whether our life plans are truly valuable (Arneson and Shapiro, 1996: 399). 
The second obstacle is: even if I am well-equipped with the cognitive 
abilities needed to assess the independent values of my goals, I might not 
be able to want my reasons to be true reasons. I might be rationalizing my 
choices rather than honestly reflecting on them. I might be deceiving 
myself about my real reasons. Self-deception is seriously damaging to well-
being because it breaks the connection between goals and reasons. 
Rationality and intelligence do not protect us from self-deception. But the 
capacity for autonomy does. One of the crucial dimensions of autonomy is 
authenticity (Shields, 2016: 59). Authenticity involves being able to reflect 
critically upon one’s major goals and to revise them so that they cohere 
with one’s reflectively constituted higher-order commitments and 
conception of oneself. By definition, authenticity requires being honest 
with oneself and one’s reasons, even when the truth is uncomfortable. The 
capacity for minimal autonomy is thus necessary to have genuine 
wholehearted commitments to goals that constitute our well-being. When 
society has to decide whether to authorize parents to withdraw children 
from autonomy-promoting subjects or schools, controversial assumptions 
regarding the superiority of a secular way of life are not necessary (Arneson 
and Shapiro, 1996: 401). They might even be detrimental to children’s well-
being, since they could amount to unsuccessful attempts to make these 
children live well by pushing them into ways of life they do not endorse. 
But society can assume that autonomy-promoting education makes it 
more likely that future adults will choose the goals that are truly better for 
them without falling into the trap of self-deception.
The first way in which a minimal degree of autonomy is necessary to 
live well is by securing the dependency of our goals on valid reasons, 
insofar as the capacity for autonomy equips us with the skills, knowledge, 
and disposition to avoid errors and self-deception. The second way appeals 
to Raz’s well-known contextual argument for the special value of autonomy 
in modern societies. If this argument is valid, a higher degree of autonomy 
might be needed to achieve well-being in these societies. Our well-being 
depends on our successful pursuit of goals we have valid reasons to commit 
to. But we create these goals out of something. Our goals are based on 
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existing social forms. Social forms refer to existing shared beliefs, cultures, 
imaginations, practices, behaviors, and so on (Raz, 1986: 307–312). Our 
pursuits and activities are to a large extent socially defined. This does not 
mean we should align with existing social conventions. It means the 
meaning, significance and sometimes the very possibility of some 
comprehensive goals depend on existing social forms.
As Shields puts it, autonomy involves certain social conditions (Shields, 
2016: 48). The social conditions, and more broadly, the social forms of 
modern democratic societies constitute an autonomy-supporting 
environment. Modern autonomy-supporting environments are charac-
terized by fast-changing technology and economic circumstances, 
geographical and social mobility, value pluralism, secularization and a 
commitment to human rights (Wall, 1998: 166–167). In such environments, 
people need the capacity for autonomy in order to flourish (Raz, 1986: 391). 
This is not just because autonomy enhances our ability to cope 
with changes. This is because this environment makes it extremely 
difficult, requiring almost complete isolation, to lead successful lives 
non-autonomously.
At this point, one could argue that this argument does not apply to 
child-members of isolated conservative communities. Their social 
environment differs from the characteristic circumstances of modern 
societies. The range of comprehensive goals available to them is not based 
on autonomy-supportive social forms. Furthermore, insofar as well-being 
depends on the successful pursuit of socially defined goals and activities, 
autonomy education might render them ill-equipped to succeed in the 
pursuits available to them.
The objection would hold if these communities were entirely isolated 
from the “external world”. In those specific circumstances, instrumentalists 
must grant that a relatively high degree of autonomy is unnecessary to live 
well (a minimal degree of autonomy might remain necessary to secure the 
dependency of goals on valid reasons). However, most of the communities 
which currently want to withdraw their children from mandatory 
autonomy education are not fully isolated. They interact with non-members 
at various levels. Existing political and social institutions structure 
interactions among members and between members and non-members. 
Members pay taxes and consume public goods. As the sheer existence of 
the Wisconsin v. Yoder case makes it clear, member of these communities 
rely on the same judicial system as non-members to protect their rights. 
Some produce goods they sell to non-members and buy consumer goods 
produced outside of the community. Some read newspapers and watch 
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television programs infused with the background, autonomy-supporting 
culture. As a result, even when they are able to protect their culture, the 
presence and influence of the broader autonomy-supporting context 
unavoidably alter the social forms that prevail in these communities. They 
also alter the very nature of the opportunities these communities provide 
to their members. The significance of pursuing the project to live in a 
traditional community differs greatly in a traditional society from one in 
which one can freely revise her goals. The very nature and value of these 
choices depend on whether they exist in an autonomy-supporting 
environment or not. In concrete terms, the option to stay in the Amish 
community or to become a nun does not have the same significance in an 
autonomy-supporting society and in a traditional society. In modern 
societies, this option unavoidably involves a choice, if only because 
background institutions provide exit options.2 And this choice requires 
exercising deliberative capacities. An autonomy-supporting environment 
reshapes the very conditions attached to these seemingly non-autonomous 
pursuits. It transforms them into autonomous choices. Since child-
members of conservative communities will be confronted with these sorts 
of choices, their future well-being requires the capacity for autonomy too. 
Therefore, in our modern circumstances, this version of the instrumental 
argument for autonomy helps us to reach the conclusion Shields wants to 
reach, that is, that autonomy education should be mandatory.
Before closing the discussion, a few critical remarks on mandatory 
autonomy education might be helpful to refine the debate. Liam Shields 
does not only argue that autonomy education should be mandatory. He 
also suggests it should be delivered by the state:
“The state cannot refuse to get involved with education and simply 
allow private individuals to provide for it. To do so would be to allow 
educational provision to be distributed in a particular way that may fail 
to recognise citizens’ rightful claims.” (Shields, 2016, 85)
Additional philosophical work might be needed to make the move from 
the claim that autonomy education should be mandatory to the following 
claims: first, the state should be responsible for delivering autonomy 
education; second, the state should be authorized to use its coercive power 
to make sure all children are enrolled in state-provided autonomy 
education. I have no space to discuss these issues in detail, but I would like 
to point out a couple of questions. If Shields thinks states should deliver 
2 Note some communities make efforts to inculcate beliefs and mindsets that 
prevent their members from seriously giving consideration to the exit option. Sociologist 
Donald Kraybill suggests Amish education is designed in such a way that the “agenda of 
ideas” is “controlled”, thereby preventing children from envisaging a life outside of the 
community. (Kraybill, 2001: 176–177)
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autonomy education because they are the most able agent for this purpose, 
something could be said about why other educational agents, and 
especially parents, are more likely than the state to fail to render children 
sufficiently autonomous (especially in less than ideal states). If Shields 
thinks states should provide autonomy education because they are the 
only agent which has the legitimate power to “force” children to get such 
education, the theory of legitimate authority with which his 
sufficientarianism needs to coordinate should be developed further.
3. SUFFICIENT AUTONOMY, FAIR EQUALITY OF 
OPPORTUNITY, AND THE REQUIREMENT OF TALENTS 
DISCOVERY
Let us now move to the requirement of talents discovery. Sufficient 
autonomy is related to talents discovery in the following way. Educating for 
autonomy requires agents to be well informed about the options available 
to them. Being informed about options involves being informed about 
one’s interests and talents. Therefore, according to Shields, “everyone 
should be given opportunities sufficient to discover their talents and 
interests insofar as this constitutes our freedom as sufficiently autonomous 
agents” (Shields, 2016, 100). The array of opportunities to discover one’s 
talents should be sufficiently broad and varied.
Shields argues that, by requiring talents discovery, the principle of 
sufficient autonomy renders Rawls’s principle of fair equality of opportunity 
more plausible and should thus supplement it (Shields, 2016: 100–105). 
According to the Rawlsian principle, social and economic positions should 
be opened to all under fair equality of opportunity, meaning that those 
with equivalent talents and the same degree of willingness to use these 
talents should have equal chances of access to the same offices and 
positions, regardless of gender, race or social background. The principle 
must include undeveloped talents and not just to the subset of talents that 
have been actually developed. Otherwise, the principle would validate 
background unjust inequalities (Shields, 2016: 102). But giving productive 
jobs to those who couldn’t have developed the appropriate skills due to 
unjust circumstances wouldn’t benefit society in general, and the least 
well off in particular. Therefore, justice requires the educational system to 
provide prospective citizens with the opportunity to discover and develop 
their talents. But it would be excessively costly to attempt to discover all 
possible talents. Hence the requirement of talents discovery usefully 
supplements the Rawlsian principle by providing a criterion to define the 
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extent to which opportunities for talent discovery should be broad and 
varied.
It is true that the principle of fair equality of opportunity would be 
implausible if it did not require the educational system to help children to 
identify and develop the relevant talents. However, the requirement of 
talents discovery fits into the principle of equality of opportunity only if 
their implications regarding the kinds of talents and the extent to which 
they must be developed converge. This doesn’t seem to be the case. The 
two principles are not necessarily concerned with the same talents. The 
principle of sufficient autonomy pertains to the talents one needs to 
adequately develop a conception of the good life (Shields, 2016: 99) and to 
participate in collective deliberations (Shields, 2016: 98). Fair equality of 
opportunity pertains to the talents which enable people to be economically 
and socially productive in a way that can be beneficial to the least fortunate 
(Rawls, 1999: 87). Of course, some talents, such as good verbal skills, have 
polyvalent functions. And, to some extent, marketable talents are 
instrumental to secure the capacity to adequately develop a conception of 
the good life. But others, such as the capacity for spiritual experiences, are 
less likely to be valuable in the job market. And talents that are valuable on 
the job market, such as combativeness, are not particularly well-suited to 
developing a conception of the good life or participating in collective 
deliberations.
Of course, the fact that the implications of sufficient autonomy and 
equality of opportunities are not co-extensive does not undermine the 
inherent plausibility of Shields’s principle of talents discovery. But it puts 
into question his claim that the requirement of talents discovery implied 
by sufficient autonomy fits in well with other demands, such as the 
demands of fair equality of opportunities. The problem is not just that the 
range of talents each principle is concerned with is different. The problem 
is that educational resources are finite. When a society decides which 
talents the educational system should attempt to reveal in priority, it has to 
adjudicate between the demands of sufficient autonomy and the demands 
of equality of opportunity. 
The implications of sufficient autonomy in terms of talents discovery 
may conflict with equality of opportunities at another level. In the 
sufficientarian educational system Shields envisions, the least advantaged 
children would only enjoy a sufficiently varied array of opportunities for 
talents discovery, while their more advantaged counterparts could, in 
addition, benefit from exposure to a much broader set of disciplines, 
experiences, and activities. Their chances to discover a talent that matches 
job market demands well are therefore higher. Or suppose the requirement 
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of talents discovery is not only sufficientarian in terms of the variety of 
talents children should be able to try to develop, but also in terms of the 
extent to which they could develop these talents. Then, the sufficientarian 
version of the requirement of talents discovery runs the risk of putting 
some children at a disadvantage in another way. Imagine the sufficientarian 
version of the requirement of talents discovery requires schools to provide 
those who are naturally good at mathematics with the opportunity to 
develop the level of mathematical skills corresponding to a secondary 
school degree. The students who would be granted this opportunity and 
no more will be unable to compete to become actuaries, accountants or 
financial analysts (which are well-paid jobs). This is not compatible with 
fair equality of opportunity. The policy of talents discovery required by fair 
equality of opportunities must take into account the effects of competitive 
and comparative contexts on children’s economic and social prospects. 
The source of the problem is that talents are goods with positional aspects. 
Their value in competitive contexts depends on how much of the same 
goods other competitors have (Brighouse and Swift, 2006). Despite its 
inherent plausibility, Shields’ sufficientarian view of talents discovery 
might actually hinder fair equality of opportunity rather than reinforce it.
Shields addresses the problem of positional disadvantages in his 
discussion of Anderson’s adequacy principle of educational justice (Shields, 
2016: 110–114). He suggests that the shift-based approach of 
sufficientarianism he advocates is better equipped than Anderson’s own 
version of upper limit sufficientarianism. To recall, upper limit 
sufficientarianism states that, once people have enough, there is no further 
reason to benefit them. Shift-based sufficientarianism states that, once 
people have enough, the nature and weight of reasons to benefit them 
change. Anderson’s view entails that, once educational adequacy is 
secured, there is no further reason to redistribute educational 
opportunities. Shields’s view entails that, once the principle of sufficient 
autonomy is secured, there may be further reasons to redistribute 
educational opportunities. Shields could thus respond to the egalitarian 
critic that, once sufficient opportunities for talents discovery are secured, 
his theory of justice can recognize there are additional valid moral reasons 
to limit rich children’s opportunities for talents discovery in competitive 
contexts.
If my understanding of the implications of shift-based sufficientarianism 
for educational justice is correct, Shields’s view of educational justice may 
plausibly conciliate two conflicting considerations that structure the 
debate about educational justice, namely, positional disadvantages and 
leveling down. Still, this does not show the principle of sufficient autonomy 
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itself adequately defines the requirements of fair equality of opportunities 
in terms of talents discovery. It only shows that a shift-based understanding 
of sufficientarianism can supplement the principle of sufficient autonomy 
with an egalitarian principle of fair equality of opportunities. In terms of 
talents discovery, this means once opportunities for the discovery of a 
sufficiently broad and varied array of talents have been secured, 
educational justice can seek to achieve an equal distribution of remaining 
opportunities for talents discovery. Then, a worry remains. If the demands 
of sufficient autonomy require a lot of educational resources, little will be 
left over to enable schools to equalize the economic and social opportunities 
of children. Recall that, according to Shields, the ingredients of sufficient 
autonomy are: (1) being well-informed, that is, being able to establish 
third-person assurance of the freedom of one’s beliefs; (2) being able to 
give reasons for one’s views; (3) being disposed to exchange reasons and to 
participate in public reasoning activities with others. It seems to me the 
educational policies needed to secure sufficient autonomy as Shields 
conceives it would especially focus on helping children to reach a high 
level of cognitive and critical thinking skills, a level most of the people 
shaped by our educational systems do not have reached. In the just 
educational system Shields envisions, important investments in the 
cultivation of critical thinking skills would have priority over investments 
in policies aiming at securing equality of opportunity such as the 
implementation of a school map (when and where it works) or reforms 
aiming at helping disadvantaged students to access to and succeed in 
higher education. The influence of parental background on children’s 
future opportunities would remain decisive. Therefore, the extent to which 
the principle of sufficient autonomy is compatible with fair equality of 
opportunities seems limited.
One might think the conclusion of this discussion is that egalitarian 
views of educational justice are superior to sufficientarian ones. But this 
needs not be true, even for those who share the intuition that an educational 
system that fails to mitigate the effects of social background on children’s 
social and economic prospects is problematic. The problem does not 
necessarily originate from sufficiency in itself. It originates from the fact 
that Shields’ account of autonomy is not rich enough. The ideal of autonomy 
is not limited to critical thinking skills and deliberative capacities. It also 
concerns social and economic conditions as well as the kind of relationships 
people have with each other. A richer account of autonomy may account 
for the problem of positional goods by enabling us to stress how people’s 
relative position in the distribution of certain goods may affect important 
dimensions of freedom and autonomy. Some capability-based and 
freedom-based understandings of the sufficiency threshold can address 
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the issue of positional goods insofar as absolute value of certain capabilities 
and freedoms depends upon people’s relative place in the distribution of 
certain goods (Axelsen and Nielsen, 2015, 419–420).
4. CONCLUSION
This essay has engaged with two of the contributions the principle of 
sufficient autonomy to educational justice. It has argued that instrumental 
views of the value of autonomy can provide decisive reasons to support 
mandatory autonomy education. It has also argued that the implications 
of Rawlsian fair equality of opportunity regarding talents discovery differ 
from the implications of sufficient autonomy. Insofar as educational 
resources are scarce, sufficient autonomy and equality of opportunity are 
potentially conflicting educational aims. However, a richer account of 
autonomy could incorporate the aim of securing equality of opportunity 
through education by stressing how such equality contributes to economic, 
social and relational dimensions of autonomy. The general conclusion is 
that Liam Shields’s autonomy-based sufficientarian view is promising, but 
his account of autonomy and of the way it relates to well-being may need 
further refinements to successfully address the two classical problems of 
philosophy of education we have briefly discussed in this essay.3
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